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ARBITRATION

Is a State Statute Allowing an Employee to Sue in
State Court Preempted by FederalLaw?
by Jay E. Grenig

Barclay Perry and James Johnston
V.

Kenneth Morgan Thomas
(Docket No. 86-566)
Argued April 28, 1987
A California statute gives employees the right to sue
in state court to collect unpaid wages, regardless of any
existing private agreement to arbitrate (other than an
arbitration agreement in a collective bargaining
agreement). The United States Arbitration Act provides
that written agreements to settle controversies by arbitration are enforceable.
ISSUES
This case presents the question of whether the
United States Arbitration Act precludes an employee
from suing in state court to collect wages if the employee's wage claim is referable to arbitration under an
agreement between the parties.
FACTS
In May, 1984, a dispute arose between Kenneth
Thomas and Barclay Perry and James Johnston concerning certain commissions allegedly owed Thomas but
which were instead paid to Johnston. All three were
employees of Kidder, Peabody & Co., a securities dealer.
When Thomas applied for employment with Kidder
Peabody, he signed a statement which provided:
"I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that
may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any
other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the
rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations with
which I register..."
Among the organizations with which Thomas registered
was the New York Stock Exchange. Rule 347 of the
NYSE provides that "any controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination
of employment of such registered representative by and
with such member or member organization shall be
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settled by arbitration, at the insistence of any such party,
in accordance with the arbitration procedure prescribed
elsewhere in these rules."
Thomas sued Perry and Johnston in state court,
seeking nearly $200,000 in damages for unpaid commissions and for several tort claims. When Thomas refused
to submit the dispute to arbitration, Perry and Johnston
petitioned the court to stay the proceedings and to require Thomas to submit the dispute to arbitration. Denying the petition, the court held that Thomas' claims
were for wages and were exempt from arbitration under
California Labor Code section 229. After appeals to
California appellate courts, the United States Supreme
Court agreed to hear Thomas' appeal.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware
(414 U.S. 117 (1973)), the Supreme Court unanimously
held that the Securities and Exchange Act did not require that NYSE Rule 347 be given supremacy over
Labor Code section 229. In Ware, Merrill Lynch relied
on the state arbitration act rather than the United States
Arbitration Act. Reviewing the legislative history of section 229, the Supreme Court observed that the legislature apparently desired "to protect the worker from the
exploitative employer who would demand that a prospective employee sign away in advance his right to
resort to the judicial system for redress of any employment grievance."
Ten years later, the Supreme Court held that the
provisions of the California Franchise Investment Law,
which required judicial consideration of claims brought
under the law, conflicted with the United States Arbitration Act (Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S.Ct. 852 (198-1);
Preview, 1983-84 term, pp. 161-63). According to the
Court, Congress expressed in the Arbitration Act a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
states' power to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims that the contracting parties agreed to
resolve by arbitration. Justice O'Connor and now Chief
Justice Rehnquist dissented in that case, arguing that the
Arbitration Act is a procedural statute applicable only in
federal courts.
One year later, the Supreme Court ruled that by
compelling arbitration of state law claims, a federal district court successfully protects the parties' contractual
rights and their rights under the Arbitration Act (Dean
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Willer Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S.Ct. 1238 (1985); Preview, 1984-85 term, pp. 167-69). The Court explained
that the purpose behind passing the Act was to ensure
judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to
arbitrate.
This case requires the Supreme Court to determine
whether the state's concern with protecting workers
from exploitative employers recognized in Ware is limited by the United States Arbitration Act's policy that
arbitration agreements cannot be avoided by allowing
one party to ignore the agreement and resort to the
courts.
ARGUMENTS
For Barclay Perry and James Johnston (Counsel of Record,
Peter Brown Dolan, 550 S. FlowerStreet, 6th Floor, Los Angeles,
CA 90071; telephone (202) 683-1100)
I. California Labor Code section 229 has been
preempted by the United States Arbitration Act and
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
2. The United States Arbitration Act creates a body of
federal substantive law of arbitrability that favors
arbitration agreements.
3. Amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 indicate a clear expression of congressional intent to preempt any state law, such as Labor Code
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section 229, which might interfere with Rule 347.
4. Even if Thomas has a non-arbitrable claim for wages
against Perry and Johnston, the remaining tort claims
must be submitted to arbitration.
For Kenneth Morgan Thomas (Counsel of Record, Bruce
Gelber, 700 S. Flower Street, Suite 2200, Los Angeles, CA
90017; telephone (213) 488-0660)
4. The agreement for compulsory arbitration constitutes an unenforceable contract of adhesion since the
selection of arbitrators under Rule 3,17 is presumptively biased in favor of management and there is no
opportunity for meaningful discovery under arbitration rules.
3. Because Perry and Johnston were not parties to
Thomas' contract of employment which contained
the arbitration clause, they lack standing to seek an
order compelling arbitration.
4. The agreement for compulsory arbitration constitutes an unenforceable contract of adhesion since the
selection of arbitrators under Rule 347 is presumptively biased in favor of management and there is no
opportunity for meaningful discovery under arbitration rules.
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